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For almost two centuries the market for force did not play a significant role in waging 
war. In the nineteenth and the twentieth century, armed commercial actors 
disappeared as a significant force in warfare. However, at the end of the Cold War, 
they made a comeback. Professional corporate entities formed, so-called Private 
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), providing force and force related services 
on the market (Singer, 2003). The resurgence of the ‘mercenary’ sparked a broad 
debate about the ethics of their employment (Pattison, 2008), control and regulation 
(Avant, 2005; Percy, 2006), and their impact on military operations (Petersohn, 2011, 
2015). While PMSCs offered a large portfolio of services, ranging from logistics and 
consultancy to armed service, most concerns were raised about the latter. A crucial 
concern in the debate was the control over the use of force. International order seeks 
to constrain the use of force and is organized around the state’s monopoly of force 
(Malanczuk, 1997). PMSCs, however, are considered to be independent of any 
constraints and hence undermining the current order (Burmester, 1978, 38; Zarate, 
1998, 122). Some even feared the emergence of a ‘new medieval order’ (McFate, 
2014). Others, in contrast, deemed PMSCs not irreconcilable with the current order 
as they were under tight state control and thus constrained in their use of force 
(Percy, 2007a, 63-64).  
In the early 2000s, the different positions in the debate settled for the 
integration of PMSCs in the current order. The provision of armed services was 
limited to a certain type of service: defensive tasks. They were considered to be less 
destabilizing than offensive combat (Petersohn, 2014). Moreover, rules and 
regulation were developed, bringing PMSCs under some degree of state control and 
to reign in any destabilizing effects. Ever since then, the presence of armed Private 
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in conflict zones is not news anymore. 
However, this delicate compromise was upset recently by an increased number of 
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PMSCs engaging in direct combat outside the regulatory frameworks. News sources 
have reported on such activities, for instance, in Libya, Yemen, Ukraine, and Syria 
(Delalande, 2017; Nossiter, 2015; The Interpreter, 2013).  
The perspective put forward here is that it may be normatively undesirable to 
extend the number of those who can wield force, empirically, however, there is no 
single positive or negative repercussion of armed PMSCs on the international order. 
Indeed, historical examples suggest negative repercussions when mercenaries took 
matters in their own hands and attacked other states dragging their home state into 
the conflict or even used force against their own home state (Thomson, 1994, 61-67, 
68, 77). However, in contrast, PMSCs are also able to shore up fragile states, facilitate 
defence against challengers and thereby maintain the international order (Coker, 
1999, 111; Shearer, 1998). In short, instead of a single deterministic repercussion, 
PMSCs have the potential to stabilize as well as to destabilize the current order. The 
variance in impact cannot exclusively be explained by the type of services they 
provide or the level of state control, but by the variance in the association of the PMSC 
and the client with the international order. A PMSC, closely associated with the order, 
will contribute to its maintenance. In contrast, PMSCs disassociated with the order or 
even opposed to it will undermine it. Likewise, if a state is dissatisfied with the 
current order, it will seek to revise or circumvent existing rules and employ PMSCs 
accordingly (Pattison, 2014, 148-149), while a satisfied state will work to strengthen 
and maintain the international order.  
The remainder of this article will, first, conceptualize international order. 
More specifically, it will discuss the current organization of the use of force and the 
changing role of violent non-state actors. This section includes a brief theoretical 
discussion about how the association of market participants with the international 
order can contribute to the understanding of the variance of impact of combat PMSCs. 
Finally, a plausibility probe will be undertaken, testing the argument in four cases – 
Nigeria, Afghanistan, the hypothetical case of PMSCs in UN peace enforcement and 
the Russian use of PMSCs in foreign interventions.  
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Considerations about the current International Order 
International relations scholars use the term ‘order’ in various ways. It may be used 
in a more material understanding, simply describing the non-random arrangement of 
units based on the distribution of material power (Waltz, 1979). However, often 
scholars employ the term to refer to a normative arrangement. Accordingly, order is 
an arrangement of units based on principles sustaining specific societal goals (Bull, 
2002, 3). While the first-order forms rather spontaneously and does not involve 
conscious coordination among participants, the latter is the outcome of a single or 
multiple rounds of deliberate and conscious negotiation (Hayek, 1973; Keohane, 
2005). This investigation follows the latter position, considering international order 
to be a regularized pattern of behaviour among units – namely states - based on 
deliberately designed rules and principles (Finnemore, 2003, 85, 95). Stability of this 
order crucially depends on rule compliance and capable units. Thus, in turn, order 
gets destabilized if significant actors or a majority of the states repeatedly violate 
rules the rule degenerates (Panke & Petersohn, 2011, 2015). In the extreme, 
restricted rule-bound interaction gets replaced by unrestricted freedom of action 
(Glennon, 2005, 940). Moreover, if states lack the capacity to govern over their 
territory, interact on the international level with their peers and ward off non-state 
challengers order is destabilizing.  
Any international order requires rules on the organization for the use of force.  
Inevitably, the organizing of the use of force in a society is built on normative notions 
of how and when force is permissible, who legitimately can wield force, and for what 
purposes (Finnemore, 2003, 1). The answer to these questions may vary from order 
to order or across time (Reus-Smit, 1999). The current order follows a state-centric 
principle, i.e. the use of force is organized around the state. The state holds the 
legitimate monopoly of force domestically and internationally (Krasner, 1999; 
Thomson, 1994, 19).  
This order is the result of a long centralization process. While for a long period 
in history multiple actors such as kings, feudal lords, or the church held the right to 
exercise force, the right was monopolized by the state at the end of the 18th century 
(Tilly, 1990, 174). The monopoly had beneficial effects on domestic stability: with the 
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absence of fighting and rivalries, interaction for merchants became more secure and 
predictable, the sovereign could focus on taxation and extraction, and build stronger 
state institutions. However, internationally, states were reluctant to phase out private 
violent actors. The main reason was that violent non-state actors were quite useful 
for the competition with external opponents. Non-state actors could be hired and 
fired at a moment’s notice, and the success of these actors could be claimed while 
accountability for their actions could be avoided (Thomson, 1994, 43-44). However, 
this practice had unintended consequences for the stability of the order. First, it 
blurred the lines of accountability and war and peace. It was not always clear whether 
non-state actor violence was sanctioned by a state, or whether the nationals fighting 
in a mercenary army were representing their home state. This made it difficult for the 
parties involved to assign responsibility for acts of violence. Second, non-state actors 
were difficult to control. They often followed their own agenda independent of their 
home state’s foreign policy. At times their actions would be directed at their own 
home states or dragged it into conflicts (Ibid. 62, 68).  
 
Phasing out the international market for force 
At the beginning of the 19th century, states took a number of uncoordinated but 
deliberate steps in order to increase the ability to manage violence on the 
international level, i.e. national laws against mercenaries and international 
agreements against privateering were developed (Thomson, 1994, 105). In essence, 
these laws and treaties introduced new rules on the use of force. The state’s monopoly 
on violence was extended to the international level, commercial non-state actor 
violence was deemed illegitimate, and states were now held accountable for violence 
emanating from their territory (Thomson, 1994, 143). As a consequence, stability in 
the international system increased as, for instance, the frequency of violence was 
reduced (Avant, 2006, 519). Over time, the framework of rules governing violence on 
the international level grew further in density. Treaties on different issues relating to 
the conduct of warfare, the rights and obligation of prisoners of war and even about 
the right to wage war itself were signed. While different in scope and issue area, all of 
the treaties enforce the statist organization of force and the illegitimacy of non-state 
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actor violence. Most prominently the UN charter explicitly clarifies the exclusive 
rights and obligations of states in relation to the use of force in international affairs. 
In general, the use of force is not permitted; the exceptions are self-defence or under 
the authority of a UN Security Council resolution. Commercial non-state actors did 
not receive any rights or even a discussion, other non –state actors such as insurgents 
were illegitimate in general, yet could be recognized as belligerents (Malanczuk, 
1997, 306-341). The illegitimacy of commercial violent non-state actor violence was 
further specified by other legally binding or voluntary agreements. For instance, in 
the 1980s and 90s, the International Convention against Recruitment, Use Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries came into force, and the African Union Convention on 
mercenaries came into force (Percy, 2007b). Both agreements reflect the essentials 
of the current organization of the use of force: state control and accountability. While 
foreign armed actors outside the armed forces are considered to be mercenaries, 
those who are integrated into the chain of command are not (Cameron & Chetail, 
2013, 66-69).  
 
The resurgence of private force 
Irrespective of the increase in regulation, mercenaries have never entirely 
disappeared from conflict zones, yet they were considered to be illegitimate, the size 
of the market was small and they did not have a significant impact on conflict 
dynamics (Percy, 2008). However, this changed in the 1990s and 2000s, when the 
market for force increased substantially in size and professionalism. This triggered a 
renewed debate about commercial non-state actor violence and their repercussions 
on stability. Opponents of the new trend argued these actors should remain 
delegitimized due to the negative repercussions on international order (Ballesteros, 
1999; Carmola, 2010), while others deemed that they could be integrated into the 
system if properly controlled (Percy, 2007b). 
In this debate, the ‘Swiss initiative’, led by Switzerland and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, was a watershed. In 2013 the initiative yielded the 
Montreux document. While it was ostensibly about clarifying how international law 
applies to PMSCs and not about their legitimacy, the document makes an 
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authoritative claim about the legitimate role of PMSCs in the international system. It 
considers PMSCs not to be illegitimate actors, but useful and even indispensable 
actors in security and military matters operating within international law (Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs & International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008). 
This is not the only interpretation possible. PMSCs could have very well been 
understood as mercenary companies and thereby moved into the realm of 
illegitimate force (Sorensen, 2017, 101). This point is further highlighted by the fact 
that this benign interpretation only applied to a specific type of armed commercial 
non-state actor: defensive PMSCs (Petersohn, 2014). Although PMSCs provide the 
same services as individual mercenaries or ad-hoc mercenary groups, they are 
considered to be qualitatively different. PMSCs are deemed acceptable as their 
corporate structures allow for integration in the legal system, and they ‘undertake 
tasks authorized by the government and so are almost a branch of the national armed 
services’ (Percy, 2007b, 61). Hence, PMSCs are tightly controlled by the state and are 
therefore less destabilizing than mercenaries. However, not all PMSCs are considered 
to be legitimate. A further difference was made in regards to the type of service they 
provide, i.e. offensive & defensive tasks. Outsourcing of offensive tasks was 
considered to be illegitimate as combat was an inherent state competency and 
destabilizing for international order. The more actors have easy access to off-the-
shelf combat services, the easier they can be deployed with strategic impact, the more 
frequent and more intense violence will be (Avant, 2006, 519; Carmola, 2010; 
Pattison, 2014, 167; Shearer, 1998). Defensive tasks, in contrast, were considered not 
to be destabilizing. Force is only applied passively, in reaction to an attack, and in 
order to protect an object or personnel (Brooks, 2000, 129-130). In state-building and 
peace operations such services can even be useful to stabilize the order (Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs & International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008).1 
Argument: Association with the order 
                                                        
1 Conceptually and normatively such a categorization may be useful, yet empirically the 
differentiation between offensive and defensive is problematic. See for an overview (Berndtsson, 
2009, 47-49). 
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The argument here is there is no single repercussion associated with the type of 
service provided or with the level of state control. In other words, a high level of 
control or security service provision is not sufficient for assuring non-harmful or 
destabilizing effects. For instance, Executive Outcome (EO) stabilized Sierra Leone in 
the 1990s proving combat services, while some PMSCs providing security in Iraq had 
detrimental effects on stability (Petersohn, 2011). Likewise, state control is weak in 
some cases, while PMSCs still have positive and stabilizing effects, e.g. in the1990s EO 
provided services to Angola, a state with limited ability to control the country. In 
other instances, a client exercises a much stricter control over PMSCs and 
nevertheless destabilizing effects occur, e.g. despite increased control of PMSCs in 
Iraq destabilizing effects still occurred (Rasor & Bauman, 2007; Singer, 2007). The 
crucial condition in accounting for stabilizing and destabilizing effects is the actor’s 
association with the order. PMSCs are not a coherent group. They do not only differ in 
size, and professionalism, but also in the extent to which they are associated with the 
order. Some PMSCs are heavily invested in the current statist order (Aydinli, 2015, 6). 
Closely associated companies appreciate the stability, lower transaction costs and the 
secure, organized exchange within a certain set of rules. Indications of such a PMSC 
are, for instance, the adoption of legal business practices, the company is generally 
concerned with providing services for the public order (apart from profit interest), 
the company’s leadership has been socialized in a professional military force, and it 
has permanent structures going beyond a single contract (Kinsey, 2006, 14-15). If 
such a PMSC is hired, it should not undermine and, at times, even strengthen the 
order. In contrast, some PMSCs are not associated with the current order. Such PMSCs 
may benefit more from circumventing the rules of the organized market or, in 
extreme cases, even purse the establishment of an alternative order. Indication of 
such a PMSC is that the corporate structure is formed only for short term profit or 
even  as a façade for illicit practices, unprofessional background of leadership, and 
little to no permanent business structures (Kinsey, 2006, 18-21). In more extreme 
cases, such PMSCs explicitly prefer an alternative order to the current order. If such a 
PMSC is hired, it destabilizes the order.  
 8 
As much as PMSCs vary in their support for the current order, so do states. 
International relations scholars have often incorporated satisfaction and trust in the 
order to determine the risk of conflict escalation and stability (Tammen, Kugler, & 
Lemke, 2017). Satisfaction can be determined by the state’s status in the system or 
the benefits it receives from the current order. Satisfied states are willing to adhere 
to the rules which shape and coordinate interaction in the international system. Less 
satisfied states are expected to undertake actions to circumvent or change rules. This 
general orientation has implications for their employment of PMSCs. A satisfied state 
may hire PMSCs to enforce the rules of the order and maintain the status quo, while a 
dissatisfied state may employ PMSCs to circumvent rules and thereby weaken the 
order.  
 
 
The empirical picture: PMSCs in international order  
In the following section, a plausibility probe is undertaken. Cases are selected based 
on an extreme score on the independent variable, strongly predicting the expected 
outcome (George & Bennett, 2005, 75, 121). To be specific, cases are selected where 
the client’s and agent’s association and disassociation with the system are high, 
predicting either stabilizing or destabilizing effects. Moreover, cases are selected 
taking into consideration the variance on the alternative arguments in the debate, i.e. 
the control- and type of service-argument. First, two cases are discussed focusing on 
the agent’s association and disassociation. Nigeria, a weak state, i.e. with low ability 
to control the PMSCs, hired a combat PMSCs closely associated with the order. The 
control- and type of service-argument suggest destabilizing consequences for the 
order, while the association-argument suggests non-harmful or positive 
repercussions. In the case of Afghanistan control was moderate, and security services 
were provided, yet the agents were disassociated from the order. Hence, the control- 
and type of service-argument suggest non-harmful or positive repercussions, while 
the association-argument suggests negative consequences. Second, two cases are 
discussed where the client is either associated or disassociated with the order. The 
first case is a hypothetical deployment of a combat PMSC under UN authorization to 
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prevent gross human rights violations. The type of service- and control-argument 
suggests negative repercussions, while the association of the client suggests non-
harmful or positive repercussions. Finally, Russia’s deployment of PMSCs in conflicts 
is discussed. Russia is an actor disassociated with the order, with strong control 
capabilities employing combat PMSCs. The control-argument suggests non-harmful 
or positive consequences of the international order, while the type of service- and 
association-argument expect negative repercussions.  
 
Closely associated PMSC: Nigeria  
Boko Haram took up arms against the Nigerian government in 2003. Although the 
group continuously engaged in violent attacks over the next years, it remained weak 
and the initial challenge it posed to the state was marginal. However, this changed in 
2009 after a Nigerian police operation triggered a large scale uprising in several 
Northern provinces (Onuoha, 2010). From then on the frequency and sophistication 
of the group’s attacks escalated with the violence peaking in 2014-15 (Campbell & 
Harwood, 2018; Weeraratne, 2017). By 2015, 20,000 people had been killed and 1.6 
million had been displaced (Varin, 2018, 4). Moreover, Boko Haram was able to 
establish control over parts of the Nigerian territory (Campbell & Harwood, 2018). In 
order to combat the threat more forcefully, the Nigerian government deployed its 
armed forces. However, a lack of investment and training of the force resulted in it 
being ineffective taking on Boko Haram.  
 
Control and type of service: In 2015, Nigeria contracted a PMSC called ‘STTEP’ 
(Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, Protection). The company deployed on a 
three-month contract with around 100 contractors, providing training to the Nigerian 
military as well as direct combat and air support (Murphy, 2015; Nossiter, 2015). The 
ability of the Nigerian administration to control the foreign company was low. This is 
indicated by the fragile state index.2 In the year Nigeria entered into the contract, the 
capability of state administration and security forces were rated low. Neither the 
                                                        
2http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/myfsi/myfsi-country-analysis/  
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control argument nor the type of service argument suggests a stabilizing effect by 
PMSCs.  
 
Association of the agent: STTEP is a company closely associated with the current 
statist order. First, the company is an international registered company. Moreover, it 
seems to be set up for long term profit. Since 2006, it has engaged in several market 
transactions and held contracts across Africa and Latin America. Second, the 
chairman of STTEP, Eeben Barlow, has a history in military contracting which suggest 
a high association with the statist principle. Some market participants, such as 
Malhama Tactical, focus on countering perceived Muslim oppression, such as 
overthrowing the Syrian regime and replacing it with an Islamic government (Komar, 
Borys, & Woods, 2017). Barlow, in contrast, has no interest in overthrowing the 
current order. He rather emphasized his support for governments and that he has no 
intention of taking ‘up arms against any legitimate government’3. 
 
Consequences for stability of the order: As outlined, STTEP provided combat services 
and the Nigerian state’s weakness made it very difficult to control STTEP’s actions 
properly. Both the type of service- and the control-argument suggest the company’s 
presence to be destabilizing. However, on the contrary, the intervention by STTEP 
enabled Nigeria to strengthen its capabilities and to oppose the challenge more 
successfully (Varin, 2018). At first it limited itself to training the Nigerian troops in 
counterinsurgency tactics, yet not long into the contract the company had formed a 
strike force to assist combat (Murphy, 2015; Varin, 2018). Eventually, the PMSC 
enhanced the government's capability to an extent that it was able to push back Boko 
Haram and reestablish territorial control. In overview, STTEP’s provision of combat 
services contributed to the stabilization of the order.  
 
Warlord-PMSC: Afghanistan 
                                                        
3 Eeben Barlow, ‘Feeding the Narrative’, 25 April 2015, 
www.eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.co.uk (accessed: 23 Feb 2017). 
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The U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and 
the Taliban’s unwilling to cooperate in combatting the terrorist organization Al 
Quaeda. While in the beginning, Taliban resistance crumbled quickly, over the past 
(almost) two decades, opposition grew again. Even though military support by 
Western forces for the Afghan state was substantial, its capability remained too weak 
to defeat the Taliban insurgency (Laub, 2014). Due to the fragile security situation, 
PMSCs were an essential element of the Afghan, US and NATO operations in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Control and type of service: The level of armed contractor support was on a high level 
since 2001. Although the reported size varies, in the first decade of the 2000s 
numbers between armed 19,000 to 30,000 PMSCs employees operating in 
Afghanistan were reported (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010; 
Sherman & DiDomenico, 2009, 4). However, they did not provide combat tasks, but 
security services, including convoy, compound and personal protection (Rimli & 
Schmeidel, 2007). In 2008, the Afghan state sought to establish control over these 
actors. At the time, it undertook a large scale regulation effort. However, from 2006 
to 2018, its capacity was categorized as very fragile with low administrative capacity 
and weak security forces.4 Nevertheless, the regulation was moderately effective due 
to the supported of multiple international organizations with significant resources on 
the ground. For instance, the Afghan Ministry of Interior sought to implement a 
licencing procedure which was supported by the EU, UN, the German Police Program 
and NATO (Rimli & Schmeidel, 2007; Sherman & DiDomenico, 2009, 4). The moderate 
level of control and the lack of combat providers suggest, therefore, the absence 
destabilizing potentially even stabilizing effects.  
 
Association of agent: In contrast to STTEP in Nigeria, many of the PMSCs in 
Afghanistan were not closely associated with the statist order. First, almost 44 
percent of the firms in the Afghan market were local companies. Although describing 
                                                        
4 http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/myfsi/myfsi-country-analysis/ 
 12 
themselves as corporations, many of these entities were unregistered and not 
formally organized in a legal structure. In essence, many of these local companies 
were rebranded militias (Sherman, 2015; Sherman & DiDomenico, 2009, 14). Second, 
the personnel running the PMSCs were often former warlords turned businessmen 
(Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, 20). Warlord-PMSCs are 
not regular companies operating according to the common market principle of 
voluntary exchange. They rather operate as racketeers. Where PMSCs defend the 
client against an opponent, the warlord-PMSC extorts money from the client. As long 
as the customer pays, security is provided. However, if the client does not, insecurity 
is generated and attacks are mounted by the same actor offering the security service 
(Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, 22). Therefore, PMSCs have 
a rather destabilizing effect.  
 
Consequences for stability of the order: Both the control and type of service argument 
suggest no detrimental or even stabilizing effects on the order. However, in 2019, 
large parts of the territory of Afghanistan remained contested or under the control of 
the Taliban (Haass, 2019), and some even consider the warlord-PMSCs to be the 
primary source of insecurity in Afghanistan (Sherman & DiDomenico, 2009, 7). 
Hence, the outcome is rather consistent with the destabilizing effects prediction by 
the association argument. However, one might object that, although the warlord-
PMSCs are disassociated from the order, they are a part of state-building. After all, 
running successful protection rackets was essential for state-building in Europe 
(Tilly, 1990). However, modern-day warlords are qualitatively different. They arise 
and prosper inside states and represent an alternative governing system (K. Z. 
Marten, 2012, 3, 21). State weakness permits them to establish their fiefdoms without 
the costs and responsibilities of statehood (Ginty, 2010; Reno, 1997). At the same 
time they benefit from the efforts to strengthen state capacity by providing their 
racketeering security services. Accordingly, warlord-PMSCs have little interest in 
ending violence and strengthening state-building. The absence of a capable state is 
fundamental for their influence and profit. In general, hiring a warlord-PMSC rather 
facilitated instability of the order.  
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Closely associated client: UN and PMSCs in (humanitarian) Interventions 
After the end of the Cold War, the UN often acted as an ordering agent, tasked with 
stabilizing violent conflicts in the international system, supporting weak states and 
protecting civilians. With the increased responsibility, the size and frequency of UN 
operations increased. For instance, in 1993, around 78,000 uniformed personnel 
were serving in UN missions. However, the ambitious goals were often not achieved, 
and missions failed (Pugh, 2008). As a result, states grew more and more reluctant to 
participate and to contribute to the increasingly expensive operations. Faced with 
reluctant member states, the UN sought to address personnel problems and tight 
budgets by turning to the market. Although PMSCs were often perceived quite 
critically within the UN, they were now increasingly deployed in support of 
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations (Percy, 2008). The market became so 
lucrative, that some firms even specialized in this market segment, providing entire 
packages including equipment, training and logistics tailored to UN peacekeeping 
(Ostensen, 2011, 12-13). Although there is an increased reliance on market actors, 
the UN has yet refrained from hiring PMSCs to conduct peace enforcement (Patterson, 
2009). However, the option has been discussed frequently in and outside the UN. For 
instance, in 1998,  the former UN General Secretary thought about a private 
intervention force, hired by and through the UN, to prevent the Genocide in Rwanda. 
However, he concluded at the time that the ‘world may not be ready to privatize 
peace’ (UN Secretary-General, 1998). More recently, Erik Prince, former CEO of the 
US company Blackwater, suggested the possibility of a private intervention force in 
Sudan (Patterson, 2009, 3; Prince, 2017).  
For the purpose of this investigation, the implications of the stability of the order of 
this hypothetical scenario will be explored - a PMSC takes over the entire UN mission 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The UN was present in the DRC since 
1999. It supports peacebuilding after a long and bloody civil war and protecting the 
civilian population against attacks from militia organizations (Neethling, 2014). It 
became one of the longest and largest peacekeeping operations worldwide, with 
approximately 25,000 peacekeepers in 2015 (Tull, 2018). The logistics were 
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supported by multiple PMSCs providing security, logistics and intelligence (Ostensen, 
2011, 16). Since the security situation was unstable, new rebels groups were forming 
and the Congolese army was unable to prevent a major city from being occupied. The 
UN Security Council decided in 2013 to establish a 3000 strong Force Intervention 
Brigade to combat and target armed groups (Tull, 2018, 174). The hypothetical 
extension here is that this Brigade would be supplied by PMSCs.5  
 
Control and type of service:  
The current use of PMSCs by the UN provides some insights about the organization’s 
ability to control them. In 2005, some of the security functions in UN missions were 
centralized in the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). However, security 
management and oversight remained challenging as other management structures 
remained operational in other UN agencies, at times policies are contradictory, and 
the lack of an effective sanctioning mechanism complicated the situations. Moreover, 
the UN cannot rely on the host government for regulation as they operate in areas of 
instability, and at times the UN mission is even forced to buy security from local 
factions or warlords (Ostensen, 2011, 23-24, 40). The UN’s ability to effectively 
control contracted PMSCs is, therefore, rather low. If the UN were to replace the Force 
Intervention Brigade with PMSCs, they would conduct combat operations. According 
to the type of service argument, hiring combat providers would then further 
destabilize the situation. In sum, both the type of service and the control argument 
suggests, therefore, a destabilizing effect on the order.  
 
Association of the client: The UN is highly associated with the current international 
order. Abstractly, the UN is ‘a set of basic rules of conduct for governments and a 
formal organization ...’ (Hurd, 2011, 43). However, more specifically, the UN is the 
fundamental treaty organizing interstate relations, and it is the codification of the 
                                                        
5 The implementation of such a scenario is however contested in the literature. Some argue that most 
contemporary PMSCs do not have the capacity to fulfill such an mandate, while others suggest that 
PMSCs can provide a fix, when UN members are unwilling to deploy (Fitzsimmons, 2005; Spearin, 
2011).  
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current international order (Hurd, 2011, 43, 70). As an organization its primary 
responsibility is to protect this order and to maintain international peace and 
security. Given these characteristics, the UN is considered to be closely associated 
with the current order. If the UN participates as a client on the market hiring PMSCs, 
it can be expected that it will not deploy them in a manner weakening international 
order, yet enforcing it.  
 
Consequences for stability of the order:  
The success of the UN intervention brigade in the DRC was mixed. While it was able 
to gain some battlefield success and stabilize the situation temporarily,  eventually it 
was not able to eliminate the various rebel groups. The reason for this was a shift as 
national and international interest crumbled which had allowed for the Brigade to be 
created in the first place (Tull, 2018). The violence and conflict in Congo remain, 
therefore, unresolved. The argument here is that a PMSC, despite the type of service 
and control argument, could have achieved similar –short term - stabilizing success. 
The prime example for this is Executive Outcomes, a now-defunct South African firm, 
which intervened in the 1990s in the Civil War in Sierra Leone. At the time a ruthless 
rebel group was exploiting the diamond resources of the country and committing 
atrocities on the civil population. The government, unable to stop the violence, called 
in EO. The company was able to deploy quickly, and thereby enhance the strength of 
the state to exert control. Within a few months the rebels had been pushed back, order 
had been restored to some degree, and a peace agreement negotiated (Shearer, 
1998). However, as part of the peace agreement EO had to withdraw which led to a 
resurgence in violence. Nevertheless, this suggests that a PMSC deployment by the 
UN, a client closely associated with the system, can provide similar stabilizing effects 
to the order as a conventional peace enforcement brigade.  
 
 
Circumventing the rules: Russia’s employment of PMSCs in Ukraine & Syria 
Russia is actively employing combat PMSCs in international conflicts. Most 
prominently, in February 2014, Russian troops occupied the Crimea in Ukraine, and 
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immediately afterwards Russia increased its military support for the Russian 
speaking separatists in Eastern Ukraine (Harding, 2014). In Crimea, the Russian 
government employed PMSCs alongside regular forces to disarm Ukrainian forces, 
seizing military installations and preventing reinforcements from entering the 
peninsula. Crucial in this regard was a Russian PMSC, the so-called ‘Group Wagner’, 
mainly composed of former Russian special-forces (Vaux, 2016). Although used in an 
offensive posture in an interstate conflict, the Crimean annexation was achieved 
without large-scale violence. This was different in Eastern Ukraine, the very same 
PMSCs –and potentially others - were deployed in support of pro-Russian forces 
(Informnapalm, 2018; Trevithick, 2017). This time, PMSCs engaged Ukrainian forces 
in combat (Rujevic, 2014). The Ukrainian campaign was, however, only the overture 
to Russia’s deployment of combat PMSCs. Russia also deployed Group Wagner in 
Syria on a large scale alongside regular Russian and Syrian forces and participated in 
several battles taking on President Assad’s opposition and radical Islamist groups 
(Vasilyeva, 2017). While the Russian PMSCs were used against domestic opponents 
of the Assad regime, the dynamic changed on February 2018, when they attacked 
military at Deir ez-Zor. This time the PMSCs targeted US-American military personnel 
which escalated into a full-scale battle.6  
 
Control and type of services: Group Wagner provided combat services and was tasked 
‘to engage in the fighting in Syria and the Ukraine’ (The Interpreter, 2013). The 
deployment was of substantial size raging between 200 and 900 operators, including 
heavy weapons (Sparks, 2016; Vaux, 2016). In terms of control, the company is part 
of a larger corporation Moran Security Group which is registered in Russia. Moreover, 
the company is closely linked to the Russian government. This is indicated by the 
close relationship between Dmitri Utkin, the commander of the Wagner contingent in 
Syria, and officials in the Russian military of defence (Grove, 2015; Sparks, 2016). 
                                                        
6 Another account is that Russian mercenaries were in the vicinity of a Syrian attack, yet did not 
participate (Reuter, 2018). However, a detailed account of the battle contradicts this (Gibbons-Neff, 
2018) 
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Furthermore, the Russian military provided training facilities for ‘Group Wagner’, the 
private soldiers were flown in on Russian military cargo planes, the unit was visited 
by a Russian intelligence General, and some of the fighters were awarded Russian 
medals (Sparks, 2016; Vaux, 2016). In other words, the company was a tightly 
controlled Russian foreign policy proxy (Miller, 2013). While the ‘type of service 
argument’ suggests destabilizing effects on the international order, the ‘control 
argument’ suggests no such repercussions.  
 
Association of the client: Russia is an actor dissatisfied with its position in the 
international system and is deeply dissatisfied with the status quo (Sciubba, 2014; 
Tammen et al., 2017). The reasons for the dissatisfaction are manifold. The current 
elite in the Kremlin grieves over the loss of its former superpower status and holds 
resentments against the liberal world order. Moreover, the EU and NATO 
explanations and the exclusions of Russian concerns in the war in the Balkans have 
contributed to the dissatisfaction (K. Marten, 2017). In combination with 
unfavourable power shifts, i.e. the fear of the Russian leadership that a reduction in 
the population results in a reduction in gross domestic product and a shrinking 
recruitment pool for the military, let Russia challenge the status quo in the 
international order. Russia became more aggressive in its foreign policy and toward 
the dominant state - the US (Sciubba, 2014, 210-211) 
 
Consequences for stability of the order: In this case, the client exerted tight control over 
the agent, yet this did not result in stabilizing effects. Russia employs PMSCs in a way 
that challenges the rules of the current order. To be more specific, combat PMSCs are 
deployed to gain plausible deniability, i.e. to conceal Russia’s involvement and to 
circumvent responsibility for the use of force. For instance, in the Ukraine, the 
Russian involvement and deployment of Wagner are not confirmed by the Russian 
government, and likewise the deployment of PMSCs under Russian control is denied 
in Syria (Grove, 2015; Roth, 2017). However, in all of these cases the PMSCs have 
received their orders from the Russian government (Galeotti, 2015; Hauer, 2018). 
The use of combat PMSCs against international rivals is an instrument to realize 
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national interests without direct participation of government force and an attempt to 
minimize accountability (Ostensen & Bukkvoll, 2018, 29). Thus, a disassociated actor 
with the order, employing combat PMSCs to circumvent the rules destabilizes the 
order.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The article seeks to contribute to the debate on the effects of armed PMSCs on the 
stability of international order. Two arguments have been frequently raised to 
express concerns about potential negative impacts of armed PMSCs: the type of 
services and the level of state control argument. Accordingly, PMSCs are most harmful 
when delivering offensive combat services and are not controlled by the state, while 
defensive services are acceptable when tightly controlled. The argument here is not 
that these arguments are misguided, yet that the suggested relationship is not 
sufficient to explain stabilization or destabilization of the order. The argument 
presented in this article is that it is the association of the PMSC and the client with the 
international order that determines whether the effects are stabilizing or 
destabilizing. Table 1 shows the result of the plausibility probe in the four cases: 
Nigeria, Afghanistan, UN in Congo and Russia.  
 
 
Table 1: Results 
Case Level of 
control 
Type of 
service 
Association Consequence 
Nigeria Low Combat High (PMSC) Stabilizing 
Afghanistan Moderate Security Low (PMSC) Destabilizing 
UN (DRC) Low Combat High (Client) Stabilizing 
Russia High Combat Low (Client) Destabilizing 
Grey shaded cells indicate that destabilizing effects are predicted or the consequence.  
 
The Nigerian case contradicts the expectations of the type of service and control 
argument. Although the client was weak and contracted a combat PMSC, the outcome 
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was a stabilization of the order. Likewise, the Afghan case did not corroborate the 
expectations of the two arguments. The client had a moderate ability to control and 
the contracted security services suggested a rather stabilizing effect. In contrast, the 
expectations of the association argument were corroborated. In Nigeria, the 
association of STEPP was high and yielded stabilizing results, while in Afghanistan, 
the PMSCs association was low with destabilizing results. A focus on the client reveals 
a similar finding. In the hypothetical UN-Congo case, the UN had low control over a 
combat provider. The argument demonstrated plausibly that this constellation leads 
to a stabilization of the order. In the Russia case, the client is disassociated with the 
order and exercises a high level of control over a combat provider. The control 
argument does therefore not predict the outcome correctly, while the type of service 
and association arguments render correct predictions. 
The findings allow for several interesting conclusions. First, PMSCs have 
agency. Although this is not entirely new, the focus in explaining PMSCs agency was 
so far rather focused on company culture or professionalism {Petersohn, 2011 
#1192}{Fitzsimmons, 2013 #1746}. The association with order is another crucial and 
potentially more fundamental factor. 
Second, it turns out that a high level of control and defensive service are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for non-harmful effects or stabilizing effects. 
Surprisingly, contradictory to the common logic that control of such actors leads to 
less destabilizing effects, strict control in combination with a disassociated client can 
have severely destabilizing effects. Association with the order, in contrast, appears to 
be sufficient to yield non-harmful and stabilizing effects. However, the results need to 
be treated cautiously and cannot immediately be generalized. On the one hand, the 
number of cases in the plausibility probe is very low. Other causes may be found 
weakening the sufficiency claim. For instance, in Iraq, both the major client – the US 
– and many of the PMSCs employed were associated with the order, yet still 
destabilizing effects occurred. However, while association may not be sufficient, it 
seems a plausible candidate for a necessary factor. On the other hand, the outcome is 
categorized dichotomously. It might very well be that control and types of services 
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have a more fine-grained influence which is only revealed if degrees of stability and 
instability are taken into consideration.  
In sum, while the status of the individual factors needs further elaboration, the 
findings certainly demonstrate that the repercussions of the heavily armed PMSCs 
seem to be more complex than just destabilizing the order and a re-emergence of the 
medieval order. Depending on the association of the PMSCs with the order, they are 
more or less stabilizing. 
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